j dence.
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In 1971, Tajfel and his colleagues (Tajfel, produce ingroup bias in the allocation of rewards Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) published the first between members of an ingroup and members of article in an area subsequently called the minimal an outgroup. This study and its many replications group paradigm. The minimal group paradigm have received widespread attention and stimulated has been greatly influential in the area of interrecent theoretical developments of intergroup relagroup relations particularly in its formulation of tions and prejudice (cf. Turner, 1987 , and review Social Identity Theory and experimental evidence articles by Brewer, 1979 ; Wilder, 1986 ; Messick 8 demonstrating ingroup favoritism. In the original & Mackie, 1989). We believe, however, that the piece, a set of experimental procedures were used ingroup bias is produced by a factor beyond the to categorize subjects into essentially arbitrary minimal group situation. More specifically, the groups. Such categorization was sufficient to goal of our research is demonstrate that the in-1) We would thank Nahoko Hayashi, Motoki Watabe, Naoko Torigaki, Toshihiko Mitsumori, and Takashi Doken for their assistance in conducting the experiment and Judy Howard for her helpful comments on an earlier draft. This research was supported by a Ministry of Education Scientific Research Grant. Requests for reprints should be addressed to Toshio Yamagishi, Hokkaido University, Department of Behavioral Science, Bungakubu, N. 10 W. 7 Kita-ku, Sapporo 060, Japan.
2) Currently at the University of Washington group bias ~r e v i o u s l~ found in the minimal group proving the social identity explanation than previsituation requires interdependence of interests ous critical studies and in providing an alternative among group members, the factor which has been theory. believed not to exist in the minimal group experimental paradigm.
The Role of Interdependence in the Minimal

Group Paradigm The Social Identity Explanation of Ingroup Bias
We argue below that the experimental situain the Minimal Group Situation tion involved in the minimal group paradigm is not Social Identity Theory (Billig & Tajfel, 19Q ;  as minimal as it has been believed. DemonstratTajfel, 1982 ; Tajfel & Turner, 1986 ) was develing this is the purpose of the research reported oped to explain the ingroup favoritism observed in below. According to Tajfel et al. (1971) , six criterexperiments using the minimal group paradigm.
ia must be met to experimentally create the miniThe social identity theorists argue that showing mal group situation: (1) no face-to-face interacingroup favoritism is used as a means of raising tion among subjects, (2) anonymity of other subself-esteem because the greater outcomes of the jects' group membership, (3) "no instrumental or ingroup raises its status relative to the outgroup's rational link between the criteria for intergroup lesser outcomes. The relative superiority of one categorization and the nature of ingroup and outgrdup's outcomes is more important for self-esteem group responses requested from the subjects" (p. than the actual total rewards accrued. Subjects 154), (4) the subject's allocation decision has no are not merely maximizing own group rewards, utilitarian value to the subject, (5) a choice be but creating a differential between ingroup and presented to the subject between maximizing beneoutgroup rewards in social competition. The thefits to all and maximizing benefits to the ingroup, ory assumes that self-evaluation is, in part, shaped and (6) the subjects be presented with a decision to by group membership. Thus a favorable comparidivide real rewards between other subjects "rather son of one's own group to another leads to a favorthan some form of evaluation of others" (p. 154).
able evaluation of self. We have observed an additional feature in the Social identity theory as an explanation of experimental settings involving the minimal group ingroup favoritism in the minimal group situation, paradigm. In all experiments using the minimal however;-has been debated both on theoretical and group paradigm, subjects who made allocation methodological grounds (Messick & Mackie, 1989 ;  decisions are also targets of allocation decisions by Insko & Schopler, 1987 ; Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, fellow group members (for example, Billig & 1989) . Bornstein, Crum, Wittenbraker, Harring, Tajfel, 1973 ; Bornstein et al., 1983 ; Brewer & Insko, & Thibaut (1983) , using an alternative Silver, 1978; Ng, 1981 ; Oakes & Turner, 1980 ; dependent measure, demonstrated that subjects in Tajfel et a]., 1971 ; Turner, 1975) . This multilatthe minimal group situation are rarely maximizing eral interdependence of allocation decisions (subthe difference between ingroup and outgroup gains jects make allocations to each other and receive I I as implied by the social identity argument and by allocations from each other), we believe, is the its measures. And, as discussed below, Rabbie et critical factor necessary for ingroup bias to occur (1989) has shown ingroup bias is caused by in the minimal group paradigm. We hrpothesize subjects' desire to obtain more rewards rather than that ingroup bias occurs in the minimal group a desire to boost their self-esteem. In the research situation when and only when interdependence of reported below, we join the group of critics of the allocation decisions exists among group members. social identity explanation of ingroup favoritism
In other words, we hypothesize that ingroup bias observed in the minimal group paradigm. We will not occur in the minimal group situation when hope this research is more straightfonvard in disthe one who makes an allocation decision is not Subjects are asked to participate in two separate and ostensibly unrelated tasks, the first of which enables group categorization, +e second offers an opportunity to exhibit in&oup bias. Group categories are commonly established in two alternative ways, both of which create essentially arbitrary categories. The first is to ask subjects to estimate numbers of dots projected onto a screen. Subjects are then divided into two groups : those who overestimate most frequently, and those who underestimate most frequently. In reality, the estimations are not scored, and subjects are randomly divided. The second common procedure is to divide subjects into groups based solely on their aesthetic preference between the artists Klee and Kandinsky.
In the second task of the experiment, subjects are asked to make allocation decisions that involve dividing rewards between pairs of ingroup and outgroup members. Subjects' decisions are anonymous and group members are not identified. A set of allocation matrices were developed by Tajfel and his colleagues from which the subjects choose. Alternative matrices have been developed, the most influential of which are the Multiple Alternative Matrices (MAM) (Bornstein et al., 1983) . Differences in the form of bias have been obsenred between these matrices, but both do indicate bias. The value of using these matrices is in determining the specific form bias will take. For instance, the debate engendered by using the Tajfel et al. (1971) matrices or the MAM's focuses on whether subjects are trying to maximize the difference between ingroup and outgroup gains or attempting to minimize the difference yet still favor the ingroup. In addition, some studies have simply asked subjects to divide points or money between ingroup and outgroup members (Locksley, Ortiz, & Hepburn, 1980; Ng, 1981) and have also demonstrated the bias.
In addition, we would like to emphasize the fact, which has been unnoticed so far as an important feature of the experiments conducted under the minimal group paradigm, that subjects' payments are determined by the allocation decisions of others. That is, the reward each member receives are determined by the allocation decisionof others. As discussed earlier, this makes the minimal group decision an interdependence situation. In Kelley and Thibaut's (1978) terms of interdependence, subjects have multilateral "fate control," meaning that each subject can at least partially affect the outcomes of other subjects in the experiment no matter what choices other subjects make. Kelley and Thibaut define interdependence by the presence of fate control and/or behavior control in each actor in a relationship. Behavior control refers to the capacity of an actor in a relation to affect the behavioral choices of another actor, while not being able to directly affect the actor's fate.
The Illusion of Control Hypothesis
Interdependence of allocation decisions was first pointed out as the cause for ingroup bias in the minimal group paradigm by Rabbie et al. (1989) . They argue that due to the interdependent nature of reward allocation, subjects could expect a better outcome from their fellow group members by showing them favor. In other words, they argue that subjects in the minimal group situation favor ingroup members expecting that the latter will return the favor. That is,"although subjects in the standard minimal group paradigm cannot directly allocate money to themselves, they can do it indirectly, on their reasonable assumption that the other ingroup members will do the same to them. . By giving more to their ingroup members than to the outgroup members --in the expectation that the other ingroup member will reciprocate this implicity cooperative interaction --they will increase their chances of maximizing their own outcomes" (italics added, p. 176). Thus, according to Rabbie et al. (1989) , "there is a rational link between economic self-interests and the strategy of ingroup favoritism in the MGP [minimal group belief an "illusion of control." Even though mini paradigm]." (italics added, p. 196 ).
subject's allocations cannot directly benefit the depc We agree with Rabbie et al. (1989) in that this subject him or herself, subjects may very well be eacb may be what subjects in the minimal group paraacting as if their allocations can. If this is so, era1 d i m would think. That is, we agree that subjects ingroup bias may be explained as a self-interested also in the minimal group paradigm would think that strategy, with a goal of garnering material rather para they could be reciprocated for the favoritism they than psychological benefits. men show to ingroup members. On the other hand, we
As noted above, our idea is similar to that of tionc cannot agree with Rabbie et al. (1989) in their claixb Rabbie et al.'s (1989) with one important exception. Instt that ingroup bias is actually rational, since one
We argue that the expectation of reciprocation for alloc member's allocation decision cannot haw any ingroup favoritism is illusory whereas Rabbie and paid i m~a c t at all on other members' allocation decihis colleagues argue that it is real. Despite this bein sions in the minimal group situation. Similarly, it difference, our explanation of ingroup bias in the I sion is impossible in the minimal group situation that minimal group paradigm leads us to the same set
I
We c subjects "increase their chances of maximizing of experimental predictions used by Rabbie and his I the I their own outcomes" simply by "giving more to colleagues in their effort to test their version of subj, their ingroup members." In sum, we argue that interdependence explanation of the ingroup bias. affec Rabbie et al.'s (1989) claim is not true as an objec- Rabbie et al. (1989) hypothesized that "the greater pred tive description of the interdependence situation of the perceived interdependence of outcomes on the bias the minimal group paradigm. However, we argue ingroup, the more ingroup favoritism will be obserrnult that it would be a true description of the ved. Similarly, the greater the perceived outcome unilz subjective perception of the interdependence situinterdependence on the outgroup, the more outhanc ation by the subjects. We hypothesize that it is group favoritism will occur" (p. 179). In their test ingrl this illusory control over other members' decisions of this hypothesis they employed a minimal group both that produces ingroup bias in the minimal group design with several modifications, one of which is para paradigm.
relevant here. In their replication condition, subOne of the criteria specified by Tajfel et al. jects made allocations to both ingroup and outexw (1971) for the creation of the minimal group situagroup members, and their own outcomes were In I? tion is that subject's allocation decision have no dependent upon both groups. In the second condiwerr utility to self. In Kelley and Thibaut's (1978) tion, subjects made allocations to both groups but subjl terms of interdependence, this criterion means that depended only upon the ingroup for their own ditic subjects cannot have behavior control ; they canrewards. In the third condition, subjects depended €3-Ou not influence the allocation decisions of others that only upon the outgroup for their own rewards. eithc i will, in turn, benefit one's own outcomes. HowWhen subjects could only receive money from the a m ever, in Tajfel et al.'s (1971) procedures, they do ingroup, ingroup bias was highest, and when lim-1 strat have fate control. They can, and are asked to, ited to the outgroup, outgroup bias occurred.
I pend influence the outcomes of others. We believe that
The experiment reported below was designed strat naive subjects in an interdependent situation withto further strengthen the interdependence explanaprim out behavior control do not always recognize their tion of ingroup bias by testing the critical role of lack of behavior control, believing instead that interdependence (and the role of illusory control their own decisions can influence others' choices. that could operate only in interdependence situaDesi We believe that subjects in this situation often tions) in a more straightforward way than in exhibit an irrational belief that they can influence Rabbie et al.'s (1989) study. For this purpose, we ed f others, and consequently their own outcomes, created two "minimal group situations." The first man] when, in fact, they cannot. We will call such a situation is a replication of the commonly used r Thirty-six subjects participated in the experi-L Instead, subjects were assigned tho role of an ment. All were undergraduate students from n for allocator who made allocation decisions, but were Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan, enrolled in paid by the experimenter a fixed amount instead of an introductory psychology course. The experithis being a target of other members' allocation deciment was run with 6 person groups. The 6 groups sions (see the procedure section for more details).
of 6 subjects were constructed based on the availaWe call this the unilateral allocation condition. In bility of subjects for particular time slots, and the id his the unilateral allocation condition, it is clear to the groups were then randomly assigned to the two subjects whatever decision they make cannot conditions. affect the reward they receive since their reward is eater predetermined. If our explanation of the ingroup Procedure n the bias is true, ingroup bias should occur only in the The basic procedure used in the experiment bsermultilateral allocation condition, and not in the replicated the major features of Tajfel et al.'s :ome unilateral allocation condition. On the other (1971) original minimal group design. Upon outhand, if the social identity explanation is true, arrival, subjects were informed that they would be test.. ingroup bias should occur in both situations since completing two separate and unrelated tasks.
,TO, both satisfy the six criteria for the minimalgroup The first was explained to be a perception task, ch is paradigm specified by Tajfel et al. (1971) . and upon completion of it, subjects were given a sub-
The major difference between the current small payment for the participation. In order to outexperiment and Rabbie et al.'s (1989) is as follows. emphasize the unrelatedness of the two tasks, a were In Rabbie et al.'s (1989) experiment, all subjects second experimenter conducted the second task. ondiwere at least partially interdependent on other Subjects in both conditions completed the same s but subjects. Interdependence was present in all confirst task. own ditions, though less so than in the original minimal In the first task, subjects estimated the number mded group experiments. .Therefore, intergroup bias, of dots projected on a screen for approximately either in the form of ingroup or outgroup bias, one second. They estimated 30 projections after 3 appeared in all conditions. They did not demonpractice trials. The number of dots were random-, limstrate that intergroup bias will disappear if interdely generated between 70 and 130. Upon complependence is removed from the situation. Demontion, score sheets.were collected and the subjects gned 1 strating the direct effect of interdependence is the were given a "mini-debriefing". It was explained lana-! primary purpose of our design.
. that the task was designed to validate a theory that some people consistently overestimate the number Method of dots and others consistently underestimate. While this was being explained, an assistant to the The experiment involved only one manipulatfirst experimenter left the room with the score ed factor, interdependence of allocations. The sheets. Ostensibly, she was scoring the estimamanipulated factor consisted of two conditions :
tions. Subjects were then paid for their participa-(1) the multilateral allocation condition in which tion in task one.
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The new experimenter then introduced the second task. For both conditions, the experimenter explained that the second task required the group be divided in half. For convenience only, it was said, one group would consist of those who overestimated the most, and the other group would be underestimators based on the just scored data. Subjects were led to separate booths each of w v h contained instructions for the second task. Thw booths were partitioned cubicles in the large room in which task one was completed. They allowed subjects to be separated from view, enabling them to make allocation decisions anonymously and disallowing them from discovering the group memberships and decisions of other subjects and communicating with them. At this time, the first experimenter's assistant returned to the room and subjects were given a score sheet disclosing his or her own group membership. Once subjects completed the second task, they were given a postexperimental questionnaire, and then were paid (payment procedure differed by condition) and dismissed. Debriefing took place a week later in depending on own membership). In addition, they were told that each member would receive an allocation from both an ingroup and an oatgroup member, and their final payment would be the average of the two allocations. Subjects could not identify the membership of other subjects, and their allocation decisions were anonymous. Upon completing the task, subjects' allocations were averaged and each subject was paid accordingly. Subjects were interdependent in that multilateral fate control existed ; subjects affected others' outcomes and were affected by others' choices.
Unilateral condition : In this condition, all subjects made the same allocation decision of dividing 500 yen to an ingroup and outgroup member. However, the cover story changed as did the method of payment. In the instruction sheet, each subject was told that two of the six subjects in each group had been selected at random to complete the allocation task, while the other four subjects would be completing separate and unrelated tasks. In reality, all subjects were allocators. The subject was told that for completing the allocation task, he their introductory psychology course.
Manipulation of the Independent Variable
The second task of the experiment varied by condition. Three 6-person groups were run in the multilateral condition and three same-sized groups were run in the unilateral condition.
Multilateral condition : In this condition, subjects were told they would be making an allocation decision. They were told that all of the subjects were making the same decision. The allocation involved dividing 500 yen ($3.85) between two I other members of the experimental group. One member would be an underestimator and the other an overestimator (ingroup and outgroup members or she would be paid 300 yen.3
No interdependence existed in this condition. While the subject had fate control over two other subjects, he or she was not dependent upon them for own rewards. It was explained that the "selected" allocators were members of different groups (one overestimator, one underestimator). Each subject would make one allocation decision to one pair of the other subjects consisting of an overestimator and an underestimator. One subject allocated to one pair, while the other subject allocated to the other pair.
Hypotheses
Based on the hypothesis that the ingroup bias 3) The sum of reward promised to the subject may serve as an anchor for his or her allocation decision. Had we chosen 250 yen, the lack of ingroup bias could have been attributed to the anchoring effect. By making the sum greater than 250, we eliminated the possibility that the predicted no bias be produced by the anchoring effect. If the subject used 300 yen a s his or her anchor and gave that amount to the ingroup member, we would have obtained an ingroup bias. A demonstration of equal division (i. e., no ingroup bias) in this condition would therefore be a stronger support for Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 2 :
The average ingroup bias in condition, not in the unilateral allocation condithe multilateral allocation condition (33.44) was tion, the following three specific predictions.were significantly greater.than zero, t =2.50, df = 15, P (0.05, one-tailed. Hypothesis 1 : Subjects in the multilateral Hypothesis 3 : The average ingroup bias in allocation condition will allocate more to the inthe unilateral allocation condition hardly existed group member than those in the unilateral alloca-(0.07), and the deviation from zero was not statistition condition. cally significant, t=.01, df = 13, ns. From the above results, it can be concluded allocation condition will allocate more than a half that (1) ingroup bias occurs only when a subject's of the total reward (i. e., more than 250 yen) to the own reward is dependent on the allocation choices ingroup member.
of other subjects, and (2) ingroup bias does not Hypothesis 3 : Subjects in the unilateral allooccur when a subject's reward is not dependent on cation condition will not allocate more than a half other subjects' decisions (and subjects understand of the total reward to the ingroup member.
the allocation task correctly).
Results Discussion
Although the experiment was run in 6-person This experiment was designed to test the groups, subjects did not interact with each other effect of interdependence on ingroup favoritism in uld ! and made decisions independently in the second the minimal group paradigm. Results indicate that task. Therefore, we used subjects, not groups, a s when subjects are dependent on others for their ect ! the unit of analysis. The dependent variable in own outcomes (the situation in the previous experithe following analyses is ingroup bias : the deviaments using the minimal group paradigm), ingroup tion of the allocation to the ingroup member from bias occurs a s in previous studies. However, the 50-50 allocati~n (the actual amount allocated to when subjects are not dependent on other subjects the ingroup member minus 250 yen). Since two for their own outcomes (the situation that satisfies subjects in the multilateral allocation condition the six criteria for the minimal group paradigm he and four in the unilateral allocation condition indiscussed by Tajfel e t al., 1971, but does not have dicated, on their questionnaire responses, that they the additional feature of reward interdependence), did not very well understand the instructions for the ingroup bias totally disappears. From the the second task, they were excluded from the folresults, we can conclude that interdependence is a lowing analysis.' As shown below, all three precritical condition in eliciting ingroup bias. Since dictions were clearly supported.
interdependence has not been mentioned a s a necHypothesis 1 : The average ingroup bias was essary condition for the social identity effect nor is much higher in the multilateral allocation condiit logically a necessary condition for the social s tion (33.44, N=16, SD=53.56) than in the unilatidentity effect, these results clearly indicate that era1 allocation condition (0.07, N=14, SD=20.00), social identity alone is not sufficient to elicit ins and the difference was statistically significant, group bias.5 F(1,29)= 7.00, p <.05.
Our explanation of an illusion of control is -4) Even when these six subjects were retained in the analysis, the average ingroup bias in the multilateral allocation condition (46.39 yen) was much greater than in the unilateral allocation condition (8.39 yen), and the difference was statistically significant, F(1, 35)=5.62, p <.05. However, the slight ingroup bias of 8.39 yen in the unilateral allocation condition, which was not significantly different from zero (t=1.37, df=17, ns., one-tailed), made the support for Hypothesis 2 less clear when these subjects were included in the analysis.
based on the idea that subjects mistakenly presume to have behavior control in an interdependent situation when they do not. This mistaken belief may be an overgeneralization from instances when behavioral control does exist. A similar phenomenon seems to occur in one-shot social dilemmas. A surprising degree of cooperation exists in oneshot dilemmas even though the dominant strategy is non-cooperation (Marwell & Ames, 1981; Qbell, van de Kragt, & Dawes, 1988) . High levels df cooperation in iterated dilemmas may be explained by the presence of behavior control, which enables such strategies a s tit-for-tat to be so successful (Axelrod, 1984) . Both the one-shot social dilemma and the minimal group paradigm are artificial situations quite unlike group experiences in the real world. Typically, group relations are ongoi& in which reciprocation occurs and behavior control is a possibility. An overgeneralization from the more common group experience to the minimal group situation would not be surprising. Our experiment does not preclude the possibility of another explanation, and further testing might distinguish these. This possibility is the occurrence of what Quattrone and Tversky (1984) call the "voter's illusion." The voter's illusion posits that individuals may select an action on the basis of correlating one's own behavior with likevote if one's political cause is to be victorious. Thus, one's own behavior is transformed from being merely indicative or diagnostic to being causal. One's own vote is believed to influence the choices of countless others. Quattrone and Tversky's (1984) experiments demonstrate such an effect.
Such a process may occur in the minimal group paradigm. Subjects have a vested interest in the outcomes of other's choices. If other subjects choose to favor some subjects over others, some subjects will make more money. Further: more, Messe and Sivacek (1979) demonstrated that the false consensus effect is stronger in an interdependent situation than not. Specifically, subjects in their experiment predicted that the interdependent partner was more likely to make the same choice as themselves than non-interdependent other players in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. In the minimal group situation, given the vested interest. in own favorable outcomes, subjects may 1 choose ingroup favoritism as a "causal" device to I I "induce" others to favor themselves. They simultaneously choose to favor the ingroup to "induce" other ingroup members to reward themselves, and predict that ingroup members will. do so because their own actions are used an indicator of other i ingroup members' actions.
The voter's illusion explanation of the current minded others and with favorable own outcomes.
experimental results is similar to our illusion of For example, a voter may take his or her own act control explanation in that both assume that subof voting as an indication that like-minded people jects try to control other members' allocation have also voted. Similarly, if the individual has decisions. The two differ in the hypothesized not voted, then this is an indication that likemechanism responsible for the illusion of control. minded people have also not voted. The voter's Having established that interdependence is the illusion occurs when an individual takes this premnecessary condition for the ingroup bias in the ise, which is the false consensus effect (Ross, minimal group paradigm, distinguishing between Greene, & House, 1977 ; Marks & Miller, 1987) , as these two potential sources of the illusion should be a basis for action; believing that one had better investigated next.
5) Ng's (1981) experiment had a condition which is similar to our unilateral condition, and he did not find any bias in the condition, which is supportive of our hypothesis. However, the description of the design is not clear enough to .assess the comparability of conditions. Platow, McClintock, & Liebrand (1990) replicated Ng's study, and obtained results that conflicted with Ng's. However, their study did not involve monetary rewards, which would exclude it from Tajfel et al.'s (1971) .minimal group criteria and we do not make any predictions about non-monetary interdependence here. Meanwhile, the conclusion that may be drawn from this research is that interdependence is a necessary precondition for ingroup bias. It may be too early to draw a definite conclusion before the current experimental results are well replicated, but the results certainly suggest that the overpsychologized view of intergroup conflicts that the mere existence of social categories produces ingroup favoritism is founded on a rathbr dubious ground.
